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INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND FINANCE
The Securities Activities of Foreign Banks in




In the past ten years there have been numerous proposals for regulating
foreign bank activities in the United States at the federal level. Four bills in-
troduced in 1967,1 one in 1969,1 three in 1973,1 and one in 19741 generated
controversy and speculation, but none were reported out of committee.
Hearings were held on two of the five bills submitted in the 94th Congress.'
H.R. 13,876, the International Banking Act of 1976, passed in the House
but not in the Senate in 1976.6 It has been resubmitted in the 95th Congress
as the International Banking Act of 1977.1
*J.D. candidate, University of Virginia, 1979; B.A. Michigan State University, 1976.
I. H.R. 570, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) (introduced by Rep. Fine); H.R. 6856, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) (introduced by Rep. Patman); S. 1741, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) (in-
troduced by Senators Javits, Brooke, Scott (Pa.), and Kennedy (N.Y.)), H.R. 9867, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1967) (introduced by Rep. Gonzalez).
The first three were the result of a 1966 study by Dr. Jack Zwick of Columbia University.
See J. Zwick, Joint Economic Committee Paper No. 9: Foreign Banking in the United States,
89th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1966).
2. H.R. 4841, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) (introduced by Rep. Patman).
3. H.R. 11,440, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (introduced by Rep. Patman); H.R. 11,597,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (introduced by Rep. Rees; this was the Federal Reserve Board's
proposal); H.R. 11,690, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (introduced by Rep. Dent).
4. S. 4205, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (introduced by Senators Sparkman, Tower, McIn-
tyre, and Stevenson).
5. H.R. 5619, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (introduced by Rep. St. Germain); S. 958, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (introduced by Senators Proxmire, Tower, McIntyre and Stevenson)
(Foreign Bank Act of 1975); H.R. 12,103, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (introduced by Rep.
Reuss); H.R. 13,211, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (introduced by Reps. Rees, Reuss, and St.
Germain); H.R. 13,876, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (introduced by Reps. Reuss, Annunzio, et
al). S. 985 and H.R. 5617 were Federal Reserve Board proposals.
Hearings in the Senate were held on S. 958 on Jan. 28, 1976. Hearings on S. 958 Before the
Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Af-
fairs, Senate, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). Hearings on H.R. 13,876 were held in the Senate on
Aug. 31, 1976. Hearings on H.R. 13,876 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
& H.R. 13,876 passed in the House, as amended, on July 29, 1976. 122 Cong, Rec. 115
(1976).
7. See Hearings on H.R. 7325 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinaf-
ter cited as 77 Hearings].
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The proposed legislation is the natural response to the recent growth of
foreign banking in the United States," as evidenced by "multiplying offices,
growing assets, increasing importance, and greater visibility of [the] foreign
banks."9 The current patchwork regulation, accomplished mostly at the
state level, creates a number of competitive inequalities between domestic
and foreign banks. Foreign banks have an advantage in some areas; other
factors favor domestic banks.' 0
At present, foreign banks have a choice of the form of operation they
will enter into in the United States. A foreign bank organizing a subsidiary,
whether state or federally chartered, must obtain the approval of the
Federal Reserve Board under the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA)" to
become a bank holding company. The subsidiary must be insured by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)," and is subject to federal
examination, supervision, and regulation by the Comptroller of the
Currency. 3 Foreign banks may also, and usually do, 4 choose to establish a
8. The growth of foreign banking here and the expanding role of American banks in inter-
national banking are interdependent developments. Professor Lees identifies several factors
which have been influential: "the significant involvement of the United States in foreign trade,
the importance of this country as a source of loanable funds, the special role of the dollar in in-
ternational finance, the size and efficiency of American banking institutions, and the highly
developed securities market in the United States." Lees, Foreign Banking in the United States:
Growth and Regulatory Issues, 5 Den. J Int'l L. & Pol'y 463, 463-64 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Lees].
9. Welsh, The Case for Federal Regulation of Foreign Bank Operations in the United
States, Colum. J. World Bus. 98, 98 (Winter 1975).
The Committee Report on H.R. 13,876 states that "[flederal regulation is needed in view
of the impact of foreign banking institutions on domestic financial markets and the domestic
and foreign commerce of the United States, and because most foreign banks operate in the Un-
ited States in more than one state." H.R. Rep. No. 94-1193, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 122, 123
(1976).
10. Foreign banks were found to have "five major advantages" in the FINE study of 1975.
They are: (1) Through subsidiaries and affiliates, they may underwrite and deal in corporate
securities; (2) they can engage in full service banking operations in more than one state, a
privilege denied domestic banks under the McFadden Act; (3) they can hold equity investment
in U.S. commercial companies or subsidiaries thereof, which U.S. banks and bank holding
companies are forbidden from doing; (4) foreign banks are not subject to the "closely related to
banking" restriction of the Bank Holding Company Act; and (5) foreign bank branches and
agencies escape the restrictions of federal reserve requirements. See Fine, Financial Institutions
and the Nations Economy, House Comm. on Banking Currency and Housing, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1975).
11. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1841-1849 (1956) (as amended 1970)
[hereinafter cited as BHCA].
12. 12 U.S.C. §1842 (e) (1970).
13. 12 U.S.C. § 1817-1829; 1844 (1956) (amended 1970).
14. Most foreign banks do not establish U.S. subsidiaries because of the National Bank
Act requirement that all national bank directors be U.S. citizens. 12 U.S.C. § 72 (1956).
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branch, agency,' 5 representative office, 6 or investment company 7 in the
United States. Under existing law, regulation of these forms is left to the
States.
Much of the current controversy centers around a facet of federal bank-
ing law which has not been applied to foreign banks doing business in the
United States: the separation of investment banking functions from com-
mercial banking functions. This wall was erected by the Banking Act of 1933
(Glass-Steagall Act),' and has been extended to bank holding companies by
Federal Reserve Board rulings under the BHCA.' 9 It would be applicable to
foreign banks' U.S. subsidiaries, were any to be formed,20 but not to
branches, agencies, investment companies, or representative offices, since
the latter are not "banks" within the meaning of the Glass-Steagall Act of
the BHCA.
The effect of all the proposed statutes would be to force the separation
of commercial and investment banking functions,2' as envisioned by the
Glass-Steagall Act and extended by the BHCA regulations, to all sub-
sidiaries, branches, and agencies of foreign banks. This paper will focus on
the appropriateness of that result. It will consider the history of the Glass-
Steagall Act and its import for foreign banks, and additional factors which
militate either for or against the extension of the Glass-Steagall scheme to
foreign banks. It will deal with the scope of the Glass-Steagall Act as curren-
tly interpreted as one facet of the foreign bank problem, but it will not at-
tempt a review of the continued desirability of the Glass-Steagall Act. There
is no attempt to discuss any other aspect of federal foreign bank regulation.
Ill HISTORY AND POLICIES .BEHIND
THE GLASS-STEAGALL ACT
The pre-Civil War banking system in the United States was modeled af-
ter the British financial system, with a "sharp division" between commercial
15. Branches are offices of institutions organized under foreign law. Agencies do not ac-
cept deposits. See Edwards & Zwick, Activities and Regulatory Issues: Foreign Banks in the
United States, 10 Colum. J. World Bus. 58, 65 (Spring 1975).
16. A representative office does not require licensing and is not regulated by the state, but
it may not do banking business. It plays a liaison role in developing business contacts for the
overseas bank. See Nevans, The Regulatory Environment: Killing the Golden Goose?,
Euromoney, June 1977, at 51 [hereinafter cited as Nevans].
17. New York alone permits investment companies. See N.Y. Banking Law § 507-520
(McKinney 1977).
18. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 3, 6, 12
U.S.C.) (1971).
19. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4.
20. See note 14 supra.
21. Various methods of effecting the separation have been proposed. One solution would
redefine foreign banks' branches and agencies as banks within the meaning of the BHCA.
Another would authorize the Comptroller of the Currency to charter federal branches and
agencies of foreign banks. The text of section 8 of the International Banking Act of 1977, which
would separate commercial and investment banking, is reprinted in the appendix.
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banking and investment banking.22 In this vein, the National Bank Act of
186423 was construed restrictively to preclude the national banks from un-
derwriting or dealing in most forms of securities.
24
The post-Civil War trust companies,2" which could undertake virtually
any type of financial activity because they were chartered under state incor-
poration law, led to broader grants of power for the state-chartered banks.
2"
The national banks responded by chartering securities affiliates under state
law to engage in activities from which the national banks themselves were
prohibited.
27
22. Perkins, The Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking: a History, 88 Banking
L.J. 483, 485 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Perkins]. The system on the continent was evolving in
a more unified manner, which survives to the present. Id. at 485-86. See also text at notes 76 &
77 infra.
23. 13 Stat. 99, Ch. 106, Sec. 8 (1968). National banks were granted: all such inciden-
tal powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking; by discounting
and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and other evidence of
debt; by receiving deposits; by buying and selling exchange, coin and bullion; by loan-
ing money on personal security; and by obtaining, issuing, and circulating notes ac-
cording to the provisions of this title.
Id.
24. Early case law prohibited bank investment in securities except as security for loans.
National Bank v. Case, 99 U.S. 628 (1878); or when acquired to settle a pre-existing debt. First
Nat'l Bank of Charlotte v, Nat'l Exchange Bank, 92 U.S. 122, 128 (1875).
An exception was also made for securities of government entities. See First Nat'l Bank v.
Bennington, 16 Blatchford 53 (N.Y. 1879); Newport Nat'l Bank v. Board of Education of New-
port, 70 S.W. 186 (Ky. 1902).
Eventually, courts interpreted the National Bank Act as authorizing national banks to in-
vest in state, municipal, and corporate bonds and to participate in bond flotations. See Dep't of
the Treasury, Public Policy Aspects of Bank Securities Activities: An Issues Paper, (1975),
reprinted in Hearings on H.R. 13,876, Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Treasury Issues Paper]. See also W.N. Peach, The Securities Affiliates of National
Banks (1941) [hereinafter cited as Peach].
25. Although the trust companies at first concentrated on estates and wills, they even-
tually accepted deposits as well. Perkins at 487. They also prepared and distributed corporate
securities, either for customers or for their own account. See F. Redlich, The Molding of
American Banking: Men and Ideas, 394 (2d ed. 1968).
For a review of the growth of the trust companies and the type of commercial banking ac-
tivities they undertook, see Kazakevich, Development of Fiduciary Banking, in H.P. Willis &
Chapman, The Banking Situation 206, 207-15 (1934).
26. By 1900, state chartered banks had virtually the same powers as trust companies.
Perkins, supra note 21, at 489. See generally Barnett, State Banks and Trust Companies Since the
Passage of the National Banking Act (1911).
27. Peach supra note 24, at 53, 62-66. An excellent discussion of the factors which con-
tributed to the entrance of national banks into the securities business is found in Peach at 16-37.
Affiliates were formed in several ways: (1) Stock in the affiliate was issued to and held by
trustees who were bank officers; (2) bank stockholders were given stock in the affiliate, which
was then deposited in a trust company; (3) stockholders held shares of the bank and the af-
filiate; (4) the stock of one affiliate was held by another affiliate; (5) stock of the affiliate was
carried as a bank investment; and (6) the affiliate was owned by a holding company which also
controlled the parent bank. Peach at 66-70; see also Treasury Issues Paper at 66, n.15.
Restrictions on the powers of national banks are discussed in note 24 supra-
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The distribution of World War I war bonds by the national banks2"
brought them greater expertise in securities dealings, and gave investors
more confidence in securities.29 The Federal Reserve Board tacitly approved
the investment operations of state banks and investment companies by ad-
mitting both to the Federal Reserve System complete with their securities
operations. 0
When corporations turned to the securities markets rather than to com-
mercial loans to finance their post-War expansion," the national banks
found it necessary to continue underwriting securities in order to compete
with the state banks. 2 The McFadden Act," passed in 1926, reaffirmed the
power of the national banks to underwrite certain investment securities.
34
28. State banks, trust companies, and private bankers also participated in the distribution
of government securities during the War.
29. As Peach explains:
Although national banks received no immediate pecuniary reward for their efforts,
they benefited indirectly. For not only did they become familiar with the technique of
distributing securities, but they gained many contacts with investors and won their
confidence, partly because of their patriotic mission, partly because they offered
bonds of unquestioned soundness. Individuals, formerly prejudiced against all types
of securities, became security minded and potential customers for future issues of cor-
porate securities.
Peach, supra note 24, at 32-33, cited in Treasury Issues Paper, supra note 24, at 67 app.
30. Perkins. supra note 22, at 491. citing C.S. Tippetts. State Banks and the Federal
Reserve System 109-12 (1929) The Federal Reserve Act, which created the Federal Reserve
System, was passed in 1913.
31. The reasons for the shift from financing through commercial loans to financing in the
securities market are detailed in May, Banks andthe Securities Market, in H.P. Willis & Chap-
man, The Banking Situation 610-33 (1934).
32. Treasury Issues Paper, supra note 24, at 68. The Comptroller of the Currency,
recognizing the threat to the viability of the national banking system posed by the dominance
of the state banks and trust companies. refrained from enforcing the existing restrictions on the
national banks' powers. Peach. supra note 24. at 50.
The Comptroller's major concern was that the national banks, if too restricted, would
reincorporate as state banks, with a resulting loss of the Federal Reserve Board's control over
commercial credit. See Annual Report of the Comptroller of the Currency, especially at 2-3
(1926).
33. 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 29, 34a, 36, 51, 52, 57, 72, 76, 81, 82, 84, 161,321,341,371,501,521,
559, 593 (1971).
Representative McFadden found the "'authority (for securities affiliates) [in] Section 5136
(Federal Reserve Act) . . .empowering national banks to negotiate 'other evidences of
debt ... ' " Hearings on the Consolidation of National Banking Associations Before the Senate
Banking and Currency Committee. S. 1732, 69th Cong.. 1st Sess. (1926) (statement of
Representative McFadden).
Senator Glass, who was to draft part of the Banking Act of 1933. was skeptical: "There is
nothing in the National Banking Act that permits it. We. . [are] being asked to legalize
something that has been done without authority of law." Hearings Before the Senate Banking
and Currency Committee, S. 3316, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. at 111 (1925), also cited in Perkins,
supra note 21, at 495.
34. According to the Treasury Issues Paper, "It]he bill was purposely couched in terms of
reaffirming the authority of national banks under preexisting law to engage in the underwriting
of securities, rather than granting a new power." H. Rep. 83, 69th Cong.. 1st Sess. 2 (1926).
cited in Treasury Issues Paper, Supra note 24, at 69.
The Comptroller of the Currency, given the responsibility for determining what securities
could be underwritten by the banks, initially confined approval to debt securities, but even-
tually approved the underwriting of equity securities as well. Treasury Issues Paper, supra note
24, at 70.
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That sanction, combined with sharp rises in the stock market from 1927 to
1929,11 stimulated more investment banking activities by commercial banks,
so that "by the end of the 1920's the commercial banks, both state and
national, [were] the dominant force in the investment banking field."
36
The passage of the Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act)"' into law
was the result of a combination of factors.3" The crash of 1929 and the sub-
sequent collapse of the banking system were widely attributed to the
securities affiliates.3 9 Egregious abuses of power by banks and bankers, of-
ten involving the affiliates, were exposed in the Congressional Hearings of
1931 and 1932.40 There was strong support in Congress for the theoretical
desirability of separating investment and commercial banking.' Other
35. Perkins, supra note 21, at 495.
36. Treasury Issues Paper, supra note 24, at 70. For an explanation of the underlying
causes of the changes in banking structure, control and portfolios, see Willis, Industrial
Changes in Banking, in H.P. Willis & Chapman, The Banking Situation 634-52 (1934).
37. The Act takes its name from Senator Glass, whose bill separated commercial and in-
vestment banking, and Representative Steagall, whose proposal led to the formation of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation-
38. See generally S.E. Kennedy, The Banking Crisis of 1933 (1973).
39. See. e.g., the remarks of Representative Fish during hearing on the Glass bill:
There is nothing new about this depression, as far as the principle involved. It is
exactly the same as any other. There was an enormous inflation brought about as
any other. There was an enormous inflation brought about because of the mass-
overproduction of stocks, bonds and other securities largely emanating from these
[bank security] affiliates, which were sold to the American people often without
much investigation, and as a result it meant a mass over production of factories,
commodities, real estate, and everything else - and enormous inflation that sooner
or later had to crash and when it did crash and the pendulum swung back. it did not
stop at normalcy but went right on down into the depths where we are now.
77 Cong. Rec. 4028 (1933) (remarks of Rep. Fish).
The failure of the Bank of the United States, whose president had appropriated vast
amounts of bank funds for personal speculative business ventures through the bank's securities
affiliates, was also attributed to the bank affiliate system. See Perkins, supra note 2 1, at 496-97;
Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 629 (1971).
40. Hearings on S. Res. 71, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. (1931); Hearings on S. 4412, 72d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1932); Hearings on S. 4115, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932). See also S. Rep. 493, 71st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1930); H. Rep. 150, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933); S. Rep. 77, 73d Cong., Ist Sess.
(1933); H. Rep. 254, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
The Questionaire on Securities Affiliated employed in the Senate Banking Committee
Hearing is reprinted, together with the answers thereto, in Bogen, The Affiliate System, in H.P.
Willis & Chapman, The Banking Situation (1934).
41. Senator Glass and Professor Willis, drafters of the Glass Bill, firmly believed that the
proper role of commercial banks was to allocate capital through commercial loans, and not to
engage in securities speculation. Perkins, supra note 21, at 501. This idea is further explained in
the Treasury Issues Paper, supra note 24, at 73-76.
The same ideas had previously been advanced in the Pujo Hearings of 1912 and 1913,
which were convened to investigate the concentration of money and capital in a "money trust."
See Report of the Committee to Investigate the Concentration of Money and Credit, 62d
Cong., 3d Sess. (1913).
Most economists today assume that capital is efficiently allocated to businesses through
the securities markets. See generally W. Baumol, The Stock Market and Economic Efficiency
(1965); E. Fama & M. Miller, Theory of Finance (1972); but see A. Smith. The Money Game.
12, 23, 44-47 (1968),
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pending legislation4 2 had captured the attention of much of the financial
community.43 In 1933, the revelations of the Pecora Committee's investiga-
tion into stock exchange practices, 4 coupled with the national bank
moratorium,45 provided the final push toward the passage of the Glass-
Steagall Act.
Four major policy reasons for the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act can
be discerned from the legislative history. First, Congress concluded that the
commercial banks' involvement with securities affiliates had undermined
their financial viability, and the Glass bill was. to aid in maintaining the
stability of the commercial banking system, in insuring public confidence in
commercial banks, and in protecting investors by preventing a recurrence of
previous events. 46 Second, Congress believed that a complete separation of
commercial and investment banking would eliminate any possible conflicts
of interest arising from performing both activities. 47 Third, Congress
believed that bank securities operations "tended to exaggerate financial and
business fluctuations and undermine the economic stability of the country
by diverting bank deposits into 'speculative' securities investments.
' '
14
Finally, Congress sought to limit the concentration of economic, financial,
social, and political power.
49
The Glass Subcommittee of the Senate Banking and Currency Commit-
tee identified a number of specific abuses which it hoped to eliminate
through the separation of functions. These included:
(1) Banks supported their securities affiliates by purchasing securities
from them, either for their own account or for accounts handled in a
fiduciary capacity, to relieve the affiliates of excess holdings or to assure the
success of a particular underwriting venture.5 0
(2) Large banks promoted their securities business by distributing
securities underwritten by their affiliates to regional correspondents which
relied on them for investment advice.51
42. Both the proposal establishing the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the
Securities Act of 1933 were pending. The latter protects investors against abuses from false or
misleading information in connection with securities underwritings, a common practice in the
late 1920's.
43. Treasury Issues Paper, supra note 24, at 83 app.
44. See Hearings to Investigate Practices of Stock Exchanges Before the Senate Banking
and Currency Committee, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933); Hearings on S. Res. 84, 72d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1933).
Kennedy summarizes the Pecora Hearings. S.E. Kennedy, The Banking Crisis of 1933, at
103-28 (1973).
45. For a discussion of the events surrounding the banking moratorium, see H.P. Willis &
Chapman, The Banking Situation, 21-29 (1934).
46. Treasury Issues Paper, supra note 24, at 27-28.
47. Id.
48. Id- See also 77 Hearings, supra note 7, at 216-17 (Securities Industry Ass'n Memoran-
durm for Study and Discussion on Bank Securities Activities) [hereinafter cited as SIA Memo].
49. SIA Memo, supra note 48, at 216.
50. Treasury Issues Paper, supra note 24, at 80 app.
51. Id.
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(3) Bank loans were used to advance the operations of the securities af-
filiates. Banks could (a) lend directly to the affiliates to finance un-
derwriting, (b) lend to customers for the purchase of securities underwritten
by their affiliates, or (c) lend to corporations which used the banks' affiliates
to underwrite their securities issues.12 Such loans were often granted, but not
as a result of objective business decisions. Banks often failed to require ade-
quate collateral, or overvalued securities given them as collateral for loans. 3
(4) Banks could and did make unwise investments, knowing that they
could be concealed by being shifted to the securities affiliate, thereby remov-
ing them from the banks' condition statements."4
(5) Affiliates could manipulate the price of the parent banks' stock by
dealings in the market. Affiliates could also push the sale of the banks' stock
to depositors.5
(6) Insider-dealing by bank officers and directors was prevalent, and
the misuse of the securities affiliates was frequently very profitable.1
6
There were also many abuses not related to the securities affiliates
which the Glass-Steagall Act was not meant to cover.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE HISTORY AND
POLICIES BEHIND THE GLASS-STEAGALL
ACT FOR FOREIGN BANK REGULATION
In evaluating the applicability of the Glass-Steagall Act to foreign
banks, there are three relevant questions: (1) Are foreign'banks any more or
less susceptible than domestic banks to the abuses which Congress sought to
eliminate? (2) would the separation of commercial and investment banking
functions of foreign banks further the general policies which Congress
sought to implement? and (3) what other considerations bear on the
problem?
There has been very little consideration of the question of possible
abuses,57 because there is little evidence to suggest that foreign banks are
any more, or less, likely to abuse their securities affiliates than domestic
banks." The only possible basis of difference is the variation in the
regulatory climate of the parent bank. In many of the countries whose banks
have established securities affiliates in the United States, "universal"
52. Id
53. Id. at 81.
54. Id. at 82.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Those who favor regulation tend to state without further analysis that the legislative
history of the Glass-Steagall Act and the BHCA indicate that Congress believed the combina-
tion of investment and commercial banking would cause "'serious economic problems." Oppo-
nents of foreign bank legislation are prone to ignore the question of possible abuses and focus
on the general policies, where they have a better slant.
58. "Abuses envisioned in the BHCA and Glass-Steagall Act apply to the operations of
foreign bank branches and agencies as well as to the operations of domestic banks. For exam-
ple, branches and agencies could lend to a U.S. commercial entity in which their parent had a
controlling equity interest at a favorable rate, thus giving such entity an advantage over its U.S.
competitors." Welsh, supra note 9, at 105.
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banking-in which the same bank performs both investment and commer-
cial functions-is the rule.59
The exclusion of foreign banks from Glass-Steagall's provisions on the
basis of adequate control by the home country, however, would necessitate
an examination of each country's banking system, and of decisions made on
an individual country basis. Such a solution is not only impractical, but also
politically unwise.
Individual treatment based on a country's regulatory climate may con-
travene the provisions of the United States' many Friendship, Commerce,
and Navigation (FCN) treaties and could, therefore, be unconstitutional.
Typical FCN treaties require that the nationals and companies of other
countries be accorded "most-favored-nation treatment."60 "Most-favored-
nation treatment" means "treatment within the territories of a Party upon
terms no less favorable than the treatment accorded therein, in like situa-
tions, to nationals and companies ... of any third country.' 16 Such treaties
further provide that
[e]ach Party reserves the right to limit the extent to which aliens
may establish, acquire interests in, or carry on enterprises engaged
within its territories in ... taking and administering trusts, [and]
banking involving depository functions .... [NJew limitations im-
posed by either Party ... shall not be applied as against enterprises
which are engaged in such activities . . . at the time such new
limitations are adopted .... Moreover, neither Party shall deny to
... banking companies of the other Party the right to maintain
branches and agencies . . . to perform functions necessary for es-
sentially international operations in which they engage.62
Under these provisions, it appears that the United States may impose
limits on those foreign banks whose U.S. operations involve fiduciary or
depository functions, but may not prohibit "essentially international" ac-
tivities. Any regulatory provision would have to be carefully drafted to meet
these requirements.
Furthermore, any application of the Glass-Steagall prohibitions to
banks of countries whose regulation of their "universal" banking system
was considered unsatisfactory, but not to banks of other countries whose
self-regulation was considered acceptable, would at least be subject to con-
stitutional attack on the basis of the "most-favored-nation" clause.
59. 77 Hearings, supra note 7, at 343 (Statement of E.E.C. Banking Federation) [hereinaf-
ter cited as E.E.C. Statement].
60. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 29, 1954, United
States-Germany, 7 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593.
61. Id. at art. XXV, para. 4.
62. Id. at art. VI, para. 2.
INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND FINANCE
Ultimately, consideration of the issue of possible abuses is not very
useful.6 3 "Questions of competition, concentration of banking power, con-
flicts of interests, and soundness of banking operations with which the
regulatory policies of the Glass-Steagall Act and BHCA are basically con-
cerned ' 64, must be addressed.
A key argument for exempting foreign banks from the separation
scheme is that the Glass-Steagall Act was not designed to regulate such ac-
tivities of foreign banks which are dissimilar to the practices of domestic
banks. 6 The principal sphere of the commercial activities of foreign banks
here involves the financing of foreign trade, 6 although recently there has
been some expansion into retail banking in New York and California
67 and
into the entire range of wholesale banking. The investment business of
foreign banks is largely confined to servicing foreign customers in U.S.
markets, 6s traditionally a part of banking business in many home countries.
Again, it should be noted that there is a recent trend for affiliates of foreign
banks to increase their participation in U.S. corporate underwritings,
although "their relative participation is small and has remained almost con-
stant when compared to the aggregate capital raised in the corporate
securities markets (only three one-hundredths of one percent).
' 69
To the extent that foreign banks do not accept deposits, one facet of the
Congressional desire to encourage the financial viability of banks drops out.
Although the protection of depositors is no longer of concern, the goals of
insuring public confidence and in maintaining the stability of the entire
63. Paul Volcker, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, comments that
"[although] you may conceivably need to prevent abuses, I don't think you can make a case on
something that might be called 'abuses' at present." Paul Volckerputs the case for stricter rules.
Euromoney, June 1977, at 54. [hereinafter cited as Volckerl.
64. Welsh, supra note 9, at 105.
65. Id. at 106.
66. Halperin, The Regulation of Foreign Banks in the United States, 9 Int'l Law. 661, 662
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Halperin].
67. Id. at 663. Halperin explains:
Foreign Banks have tended to expand their retail operations by merging with or ac-
quiring United States banks which already possess a number of retail branches....
Antitrust enforcement efforts directed against domestic bank mergers have facilitated
the entry of international banks into American markets.
The expansion into retail banking has provoked the most heated opposition from
small and medium sized independent banks who are facing increasingly aggressive
competition from foreign banks bidding for consumer business.
68. Welsh, supra note 9, at 104; 77 Hearings, supra note 7, at 302-03 (statement of John F.
Lee, Executive Vice President, New York Clearing House Association) [hereinafter cited as
N.Y. Clearing House Statement].
69. Hearings on S.958 Foreign Bank Act of 1975, Before the Subcomm. on Financial In-
stitutions of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.,
233 (1976) (statement of George H. Dixon, Deputy Secretary of Treasury).
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commercial banking system are still applicable.7" Again, to the extent that
foreign funds rather than domestic funds are diverted into the "speculative"
securities investments, there is less reason to worry about the effects of that
movement of capital on the local economy. However, as world financial
markets become increasingly integrated, that argument will gradually
become less cogent.
Concern for the concentration of economic, financial, social, and
political power should be relegated to federal control, whether it be
regulatory or permissive. The current lack of federal policy leaves regulation
up to those states which have decided to allow foreign banks to do business
within their borders. As Welsh points out, "a national, not state, perspective
is required to assess the affiliations of foreign banks of securities. . . firms,
since the latter are not subject to state banking boundaries."'" The United
States is "virtually the only [country] in the world in where [sic] neither the
central government nor the central bank, has a say in the regulation of
foreign banks."7
The analytical difficulty in attempting to apply the policies Congress
sought to implement in 1933 is that the current situation is confronted by
"facts clearly not then contemplated by Congress.1 73 This 45 year difference
demands the careful consideration of other relevant factors in addition to
historical policy analysis.
IV. ADDITIONAL FACTORS
The most commonly advanced reason for extending the separation of
commercial and investment banking to foreign banks operating locally is
that domestic and foreign banks should receive equal treatment under the
law.
Proponents of equality as a basis for federal regulation advance two
lines of argument to support their position. The first contends that parity of
treatment is theoretically desirable; the second attacks the unequal treat-
ment of domestic and foreign banks because of the establishment of an in-
tolerable competitive advantage for foreign banks over domestic banks.
70. Welsh elucidates:
While branches and agencies have small domestic deposit-taking activities, they do
play significant roles in international trade financing, commercial lending, and
foreign exchange and money-market operations, Should a branch or agency of a
foreign bank in this country have to close its doors, it would not only affect depositors
(at a branch) but also other U.S. creditors of the branch or agency, including
specifically many domestic banks, and would undoubtedly have an effect on the na-
tion's financial markets. Given the multistate operations of many foreign banks, these
effects could be felt throughout the country.
Welsh, supra note 9, at 107.
71. Welsh, supra note 9, at 105.
Another justification offered for establishing federal policy is the problem of effectively
controlling the money supply. Halperin argues that "foreign bank offices in the United States
can shift funds in and out of the country using overseas sources which are unresponsive to Un-
ited States policies." Halperin. supra note 66, at 671; See also Volcker, supra note 63, at 56.
72. Terzakis, How to Regulate Foreign Banks?, 68 Banking 72, 74 (1976),
73. SIA Memo, supra note 48, at 217.
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Many advocates of equal treatment base their position on principle
rather than on the existence of actual harm: "It is a cardinal principle of
United States policy that foreign companies operating in this country
should be subject to the same rules and regulations which govern
domestically owned companies.""?s These commentators recognize that
while foreign banks enjoy certain competitive advantages over domestic
banks, they are also subject to some restrictions which do not apply to
domestic banks.7" In this vein, any regulation of foreign banks should
remove both competitive advantages and handicaps.
Opponents of regulation assert that, regardless of the desirability of
equal treatment, it is impossible to achieve. They contend that because of
the different structure of investment and commercial banking systems in
foreign banks' home countries, what purports to be equal treatment will, in
fact, be unequal treatment in some cases.
In continental Europe, for example, a "universal" banking system
which integrates commercial and investment banking is common.
7 6 Banks
act as depository institutions as well as buyers and sellers of shares in in-
dustrial and commercial enterprises. The governments of countries on the
continent have, at times, requested banks to purchase securities; on other
occasions, economic necessity has forced the banks to acquire commercial
and industrial holdings in order to sustain certain enterprises.
77 Applying
the Glass-Steagall Act's restrictions to U.S. affiliates of such universal
banks would force them to choose between establishing commercial bank-
ing operations here or extending their securities operations, which are a nor-
mal part of their business, to the United States.7" This scheme curtails entry
into the U.S. market by banks from countries with an integrated system,
while giving countries with systems similar to ours full access. Countries
with an integrated system are disadvantaged in the United States simply
because their banking system has evolved differently. The end result is
"equal" treatment between U.S. and foreign banks at the expense of une-
qual and discriminatory treatment of foreign countries. Whether this is un-
fair or undesirable is ultimately a question of policy.
74. Halperin, supra note 66, at 661.
75. Eg., the requirement that directors of Federal Reserve Banks be U.S. citizens, supra
note 14, and the limitations on access to the Fed's discount window.
76. E.E.C. Statement, supra note 59, at 343.
77. 77 Hearings, supra note 7, at 338-39 (statement of Dr. Wolfgang Jang).
78. The E.E.C. contends that extension of the Glass-Steagall Act to foreign banks would
"close the door to new continental European securities operations in the United States because
no one else but banks are in the securities business in most European countries." E.E.C State-
ment, supra note 59, at 345.
The E.E.C, statement points out that
Itihese [European] banks are not asking that the American unit of a European
bank be allowed to perform both commercial and securities activities within the
United States. They ask only that the foreign banks not be prohibited from es-
tablishing two separate units in the United States, one to perform commercial banking
activities and the other, investment banking activities, solely because outside the U.S.,
in their home country, the parent banks perform both functions [emphasis added].
Id. at 344.
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The situation is complicated by the fact that U. S. banks are allowed to
engage in securities operations abroad through Edge Act corporations,
despite the illegality of such activities here. We allow our own banks to take
advantage of the differences in banking systems abroad, while curtailing the
activities of foreign banks in this country to fit the U. S. system.79 Thus, the
practical result of applying the separation principle would be to "give free
reign to U.S. banks and securities firms to compete very strongly in Europe
in all areas while telling European banks they would be allowed to compete
in only one or the other area."50 This is logically consistent in terms of
reciprocity; in both cases foreign banks are accorded the same treatment
that domestic banks in that country would receive.
There are, however, weaknesses with the reciprocity argument. A key
problem is that "the nationality of banks has little bearing on the questions
of competition, concentration of banking power, conflicts of interests, and
soundness of banking operations with which the regulatory policies of the
Glass-Steagall Act and BHCA are basically concerned."'" An additional
problem is that reciprocity "results in banking institutions coming from dif-
ferent banking traditions and environments operating under different sets of
rules in the United States," a policy which could be "both politically and
economically unsatisfactory." 82 What seems at first blush to be a logical
principle should probably be rejected for the foregoing reasons, although
this, again, is a question of policy.
As to the second line of reasoning, the focus is usually on the "unfair
competitive advantage" of foreign banks which have both securities com-
panies and commercial banking operations in the United States. Foreign
banks are able to offer their customers the entire spectrum of banking ser-
vices while American banks must choose between investment and commer-
cial banking. Ironically, those U.S. banks which have commented on the
proposed legislation do not favor it; rather, they believe that the resulting in-
crease in activity in large U.S. cities is to their benefit.8 3
A second facet of the unfair competition argument concerns the special
privileges granted to banks because of their importance as financial inter-
mediaries. Banks receive favorable tax treatment. In addition, banks benefit
from the entry restrictions. They are able to obtain funds at comparatively
low rates from depositors, from other banks in the federal funds market,
79. 77 Hearings, supra note 7, at 394-95 (statement of James E. David, President of the
Boston Stock Exchange, Inc.) [hereinafter cited as Boston Stock Exchange Statement].
80. French Bankers Association deputy managing director Paul Fabre, quoted in Hen-
drickson, Foreign Banking in America II: Will Congress Finally Crack Down on Foreign Banks?,
Inst. Investor, Sept. 1977 at 137, 138.
81. Welsh, supra note 9, at 105.
82. Id.
83. "We're in favour of competition. The more entrants, the better the game, says George
Sharp of Citibank. 'New York's foreign exchange business is more important now because
these large foreign banks are here. It lends credibility to New York as a foreign exchange cen-
ter. And the foreign banks have brought with them a greater demand for sophisticated banking
deals, which used to be found only in London, Paris, or Hong Kong.'
Nevans, supra note 16, at 23.
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and at the Federal Reserve discount window. The securities industry argues
that these privileges, which are ultimately paid for by the taxpayer or the
depositor, are intended to make low cost credit available and should not be
used to benefit banks' non-banking activities - more specifically, their
securities activities."4 The gist of the argument is that U.S. broker/dealers
cannot compete with foreign banks' securities affiliates because of the
special advantages garnered by the latter in their role as banks.
Some of these advantages, however, are limited to domestic banks. 5
Further, to the extent that foreign banks' securities affiliates focus on non-
domestic underwriting,"6 they do not compete with most domestic broker-
dealers.8 7 The major flaw in the securities industry's argument is that it can
also be applied to the securities activities currently performed by domestic
commercial banks.
There are undeniable advantages. Two questions come to mind: (1)
How important is it that foreign banks be able to provide the full range of
banking services in light of the securities activities which U.S. commercial
banks currently perform and (2) how important are the differences between
foreign securities affiliates and domestic securities firms, and between
foreign banks and domestic commercial banks, given the relatively small
scope of all foreign banking operations in the United States?
The scope of securities operations of U.S. commercial banks has in-
creased enormously since World War II. Banks currently engage in five ma-
jor types of securities activities, either directly or through affiliates perform-
ing "bank-related activities," as permitted by the BHCA. The areas are (1)
Agency or brokerage-oriented services; (2) money management services; (3)
financial advisory work; (4) medium and long-term lending and private
placement services; and (5) investment banking activities abroad. 8 These
activities are described in greater depth in the Appendix.
Despite the encroachments on traditional investment banking ac-
tivities,8 9 there remain some areas into which commercial banks have either
chosen not to enter, or are prohibited from entering.90 The Glass-Steagall
Act prohibits the flotation, issue, underwriting, public sale, or distribution
84. SIA Memo, supra note 48, at 217.
85. See notes 14 and 74, supra.
86. Cf text accompanying notes 66-69supra.
87. Lees believes that "[from a practical standpoint foreign banks are not an important
factor in the securities or investment banking industry in the United States." Lees, supra note 8,
at 474.
88. The first four categories are suggested by the Treasury Issues Paper, supra note 24.
89. SIA Memo, supra note 48, at 220.
90. Section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act expressly limits dealing in securities by national
banks to "purchasing and selling such securities and stock without recourse, solely upon the or-
der, and for the account of, customers, and in no case for its own account, and the [national
bank] shall not underwrite any issue of securities or stock." 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1971).
Section 21 of Glass-Steagall Act, which bars any person or organization engaged in un-
derwriting securities from engaging at the same time to any extent whatever in the business of
deposit banking, in effect extends the securities prohibitions to insured nonmember banks. 12
U.S.C. § 378(a) (1971).
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corporate securities,9' the underwriting of municipal revenue bonds (with a
few limited exceptions), 92 and the sponsorship of open-end investment com-
panies or mutual funds. To date, commercial banks have not gone into the
retail brokerage business, although it is unclear whether the relevant
statutory language actually prohibits them from doing so." Banks do act as
liaisons between customers and broker/dealer firms.
By far the most important activities from which commercial banks
abstain are the dealings in corporate securities, previously discussed. In
evaluating how much of a handicap this is, it is instructive to note who is
complaining about it. Much of the opposition to the proposed legislation
has come from foreign banks, regional stock exchanges, and large New
York banks. The Securities Industry Association and the Bankers for
Foreign Trade (representing regional banks) have favored the proposed
statute.
The positions of the regional stock exchanges and the Securities In-
dustry Association are based on fears of decreased business. The regional
exchanges want to continue to reap the benefits that foreign brokerage firms
bring to them,9 4 while the securities industry opposes the activities of either
domestic or foreign banks in the securities market." The big New York
banks feel they have much in common with the foreign banks,96 and do not
want restrictive legislation while review of the Glass-Steagall Act is pending.
The regional banks favor extension of the Glass-Steagall separation
because they object to competition in the retail banking area. 97 Few regional
and state banks have any interest in entering the securities arena.
In all, the banks which stand to be hurt by the current permissive policy
are not asking for relief from that policy. It is other, often more general, in-
terests that have expressed strong feelings. The fair implication from this is
that foreign banks' securities affiliates do not now have a very significant
competitive advantage, although concededly that could change. 8
The growth of foreign banking has had positive implications in many
money-related areas. The influx of foreign bank operations "has im-
measurably enhanced New York's role as an international financial center
and greatly added to the international character of what not so long ago was
primarily a domestic market. Similarly, the move of foreign banks to
California has substantially contributed to the international orientation -of
91. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1971).
92. See 12 C.F.R. § 1.3(g) (1977).
93. Treasury Issues Paper, supra note 24, at 36.
94. See text accompanying note 103, infra.
95. See, e.g., 77 Hearings, supra note 7, at 209 (statement of Edward 1. O'Brien, President,
Securities Industry Association).
96. See the strong opposition to H.R. 7325 by the New York Clearing House Association,
which has as members most of New York's major commercial banks. New York Clearing
House Statement, supra note 68, at 295-96.
97. Note 67supra.
98. See Edwards & Zwick, Activities and Regulatory Issues: Foreign Banks in the United
States, 10 Colum. J. World Bus. 58, 66 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Edwards & Zwick],
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banking in that state." 9 There is greater breadth and depth in the U.S.
money market and foreign exchange market, and better service for mul-
tinational corporations and foreign-traders who require international
financing.' 00 More specifically, the foreign banks' securities operations have
contributed to the growth of the U.S. economy as well as to the world
economy. Both direct and portfolio investments here, by corporations and
by individuals, have been facilitated by the foreign securities affiliates.
10'
The regional stock exchanges of which European banks' securities af-
filiates are members are especially interested in preventing the split of
foreign banks' commercial and investment banking.'0 2 Foreign member-
firms provide a "wide range of services ... to both domestic and foreign in-
vestors," the most important of which are: (1) As dealer specialists on the
regional exchanges, and (2) as dealers for their own accounts and risk in in-
ternational arbitrage. Both of those activities will be banned by
separationist legislation.'0 3 The thrust of the regional exchanges' argument
is that separation runs contrary to the principle of fostering competition
among market centers, 04 one of the prime purposes of the 1975 Amend-
ments to the Securities Acts. The open membership provided by the Amend-
ments may be denied only if minimum capital or competency requirements
are not met, or by statutory disqualification. The House Commerce Com-
mittee and the Senate Banking Committee which considered the amend-
ments made a conscious decision not to prohibit securities affiliates of
foreign banks from membership. 05 The exchanges argue that it would be
"inconsistent for Congress, on the one hand, to prohibit a United States
securities exchange from discriminating against a securities firm of foreign
bank parentage, and on the other hand, to forbid a securities firm of foreign
bank parentage with a commercial banking presence in this country from
being a . . . member of a United States stock exchange .... ."0.
Also supporting the status quo is the fact that the foreign banks'
"overall impact on our balance of payments has been favorable." 0 7 This is
attributable in part to the balances supplied by foreign banks to their agen-
99. Klopstock, Foreign Banks in the United States: Scope and Growth of Operations, Fed.
Res. Bd. N.Y., Monthly Rev., June 1973, at 140, 150 [hereinafter cited as Klopstock].
100. Id. at 153.
101. Id.
102. The regional exchanges are affected more than the New York and American Stock
Exchanges because the latter have not permitted foreign-controlled firms to become members
until very recently, while the regional exchanges have permitted such memberships. 77
Hearings, supra note 7, at 89 (Boston Stock Exchange Statement).
103. Id. at 388-89.
104. 77 Hearings, supra note 7, at 426 (Statement of Michael S. Tobin. President, Midwest
Stock Exchange, Inc.).
105. Boston Stock Exchange Statement, supra note 79, at 394. This is consistent with the
treatment of U.S. banks' Edge Act affiliates, which are allowed to engage in securities activities
in many foreign countries despite the fact that Edge Act affiliates securities would not be legal
here; while foreign banks' securities affiliates operations are sanctioned at home. Id.
106. Id. at 395.
107. Klopstock, supra note 99, at 153.
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cies and branches to enable them to finance their operations,0 °8 and in part
to the channeling of foreign funds into the U.S. capital market induced by
foreign securities affiliates, which convert liquid dollar holdings into non-
liquid investments. Although it is "difficult to quantify the net effect of
foreign banking on this nation's balance of payments because of a lack of
published data, there appears to be a concensus among authorities that the
expansion of foreign banks has had a positive, if uncontrolled, impact."' °9
Many of those who oppose regulation of foreign banks' securities
operations do so on the belief that the negative consequences of forcing
foreign banks to divorce their commercial and investment banking func-
tions outweigh any reason to take such action.
The fear of retaliation by foreign countries is probably the most fre-
quently advanced argument, but it is often no more than an unsupported
slogan. It is a bi-polar issue. Some believe that the proposed regulation "is
likely to invite retaliation"'' 0 while others opine that such legislation
"should not provide a basis for retaliation by foreign governments.""'
Most of the response from other countries has not been official
criticism but rather reactions from banks, banking organizations, and
others who have an interest at stake."' The German and Swiss governments
have, however,"express[ed] uneasiness over certain aspects of the proposed
International Banking Act.""' 3
A "grandfather" clause permitting securities affiliates which were es-
tablished in good faith reliance on existing U.S. laws to continue their
operations would lessen the possibility of retaliation."' The grandfathering
issue, however, has been one of the most hotly contested. Proponents of
grandfathering argue fairness, while opponents demand an across-the-board
application of the principles of the Glass-Steagall Act. The arguments are
much the same as those for and against the extension of the Glass-Steagall
Act in the first instance.
The retaliation issue is a touchy one because "[t]he potential loss for
the United States is much greater than for foreign banks, and retaliation
against U.S. banks would seriously damage U.S. foreign commerce as well
108. ld. Both the "initial'capital invested by foreign banks to establish offices, [and the]
subsequent advances to American affiliates, represent a net inflow of capital." Id.
109. Halperin. supra note 66, at 671. Other reasons for the net positive effect on the
balance of payments are (1) "deposits made by foreigners in United States offices of foreign
banks have generally exceeded the volume of foreign loans made by these institutions ... [and
(2)] those foreign banks which have played a major role in trade financing have contributed to
improving our trade balances." Id.
110. N.Y. Clearing House Statement, supra note 68, at 305. See German Banks Attack
Equal Treatment, Am. Banker, July 13, 1976.
111. 77 Hearings, supra note 7, at 671 (Statement of Paul H. Boeker, Acting Assistant
Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State).
112. See Welsh, supra note 9, at 102.
113. 77 Hearings, supra note 7, at 641 (Statement of Anthony M. Solomon, Under
Secretary of the Treasury).
114. See, e.g., 77 Hearings, supra note 7, at 649 (Swiss Banks' Policy Position); SIA
Memo, supra note 48, at 288.
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as have an adverse impact on the U.S. economy. I''I It is difficult to tell ex-
actly what the chances of retaliation are. It does seem, however, that the
problem is not irresolvable, and should not be weighed too heavily against
the proposed legislation.
Another objection to federal legislation in this field is the possibility of
extraterritorial application of U.S. law. One concern is that the authority of
U.S. banking authorities should not be extended to foreign banks' home of-
fices or to regulation of the organization and internal affairs of a foreign
bank." 6 Another potential problem, the effect on foreign banks' U.S. in-
dustrial holdings, falls within the realm of the BHCA." 7 As neither of these
concerns relate directly to the provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act, the ex-
traterritorial law problem should not be asserted as a stumbling block to the
divorce of commercial and investment banking.
V. CONCLUSION
The history and policies behind the Glass-Steagall Act and the pros and
cons of extending it to foreign banks are important, but one further factor
must be considered: the Congress recently has undertaken a review of the
Glass-Steagall Act with respect to domestic banks."1
8 Many believe that the
Glass-Steagall Act is obsolete and redundant in today's world, while others
believe that it is necessary for the continued health of the U.S. banking
system. Although repeal or amendment of the Glass-Steagall Act does not
seem imminent, it is difficult to perceive much rationality in extending a
statute, the provisions of which are not entirely clear' "' and the vitality of
which is questionable.
The importance of the proposed legislation is reflected in the great
volume of commentary it has generated. Moreover, the U.S. solution to this
problem may set precedent for foreign countries. 20 There is a need for
careful balancing of the various interests at stake.
Clearly, the cost of delay is less than the cost of adopting a "hasty, un-
informed remedy."'' An examination of the policy reasons for separating
commercial and investment banking is an appropriate predecessor to federal
115. Perkins, supra note 22, at 116. See also Lees, supra note 8, at 682.
116. See 77 Hearings, supra note 7, at 651 (Swiss Banks' Policy Position).
117. The problem occurs when a foreign bank has a controlling interest in a manufacturer
in its home country and that manufacturer has U.S. subsidiaries. Application of the BHCA
could result in "a U.S. tail wagging a much larger foreign dog-perhaps contrary to a national
directive of a foreign bank's home country." Welsh, supra note 9, at 105.
118. See "The Securities Activities of Commercial Banks, Study Outline," Subcomm. on
Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975); Hearings on the Securities Activities of Commercial Banks Before the Subcomm. on
Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1975) (900 + pp.); Hearings on Brokerage and Related Commercial Bank Activities Before the
Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (1100 4 pp.).
119. See text accompanying note 93 supra.
120. See Hutton, The Regulation of Foreign Banks-A European Viewpoint, 10 Colum. J.
World Bus., 109, 109 (1975).
121. Edwards & Zwick, supra note 98, at 66.
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foreign bank regulation in this field. "The wisdom and effectiveness of the
Glass-Steagall Act in a world of multinational financial markets and institu-
tions is not obvious."'1
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APPENDIX
INTERNATIONAL BANKING ACT OF 1977, SECTION 8
SEC. 8 (a) Except as otherwise provided in this section (1) any foreign
bank that maintains a branch or agency in a State, (2) any foreign bank or
foreign company controlling a foreign bank that controls a commercial
lending company organized under State law, and (3) any company of which
any foreign bank or company referred to in (1) and (2) is a subsidiary shall
be subject to the provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, and
to sections 105 and 106 of the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of
1970 in the same manner and to the same extent that bank holding com-
panies are subject thereto, except that any such foreign bank or company
shall not by reason of this subsection be deemed a bank holding company
for purposes of section 3 of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956.
(b) After December 31, 1985, no foreign bank or other company to
which subsection (a) applies on the date of enactment of this Act may retain
direct or indirect ownership or control of any voting shares of any nonbank-
ing company in the United States that it owned, controlled, or held with
power to vote on the date of enactment of this Act or engage in any non-
banking activities in the United States in which it was engaged on such date
unless authorized by subsection (c) of this section or by the Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System under section 4 of the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956.
(c) After December 31, 1985, notwithstanding the prohibitions of sub-
section (b) of this section, a foreign bank or other company to which subsec-
tion (a) applies on the date of enactment of this Act may continue to
engage in nonbanking activities in the United States in which directly or
through an affiliate it was lawfully engaged on December 3, 1974 (or on a
date subsequent to December 3, 1974, in the case of activities carried on as
the result of the direct or indirect acquisition, pursuant to a binding written
contract entered into on or before December 3, 1974, of another company
engaged in such activities at the time of acquisition) and may retain direct or
indirect ownership or control of any voting shares of any nonbanking com-
pany that it (1) owned, controlled, or held with power to vote on December
3, 1974 (or on a date subsequent to December 3, 1974, if acquired by a writ-
ten contract entered into on or before such date) and (2) that does not
engage in any activities other than those in which such foreign bank, com-
pany, or affiliate may engage by virtue of this subsection or section 4 of the
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956; except that the Board by order, after
opportunity for hearing, may terminate the authority conferred by this sub-
122. Id. at 71. It has also been noted that the provisions of the International Banking Act
dealing with the Glass-Steagall issue are "not a model of clarity." 77 Hearings, supra note 7, at
160 (Statement of George H. Dixon).
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section (c) on any such foreign bank or company to engage directly or
through an affiliate in any activitiy otherwise permitted by this subsection
(c) if it determines, having due regard to the purposes of this Act and the
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, that such action is necessary to pre-
vent undue concentration of resources, decreased or unfair competition,
conflicts of interest, or unsound banking practices in the United States.
Notwithstanding any exercise of the authority conferred upon the Board by
this subsection (c), in the case of any such foreign bank or company that
engages directly or indirectly through an affiliate in the business of un-
derwriting, distributing, or otherwise buying or selling stocks, bonds, and
other securities in the United States, such foreign bank or company may
continue to engage in such business in the United States to the extent not
prohibited for national banks by paragraph Seventh of section 5136 of the
Revised Statutes of the United States (12 U.S.C. 24) and, in addition, may
continue to engage in the United States in the business of underwriting and
distributing securities to the extent necessary to participate in customary
and usual syndicate activities in the United States by the managing un-
derwriters or other underwriters on behalf of all syndicate members in con-
nection with underwritings of such secutities so long as the individual selling
and distribution activities of any such foreign bank or company (whether
direct or indirect through an affiliate) in connection with any such un-
derwriting are confined to jurisdictions other than the United States.
Nothing in this subsection (c) shall be construed to authorize any foreign
bank or company referred to in this subsection (c), or any affiliate thereof,
to engage in activities authorized by this subsection (c) through the acquisi-
tion, pursuant to a contract entered into after December 3, 1974, of any in-
terest in or the assets of a going concern engaged in such activities. Any
foreign bank or company that is authorized to engage in any activity pur-
suant to this subsection (c) but, as a result of action of the Board, is required
to terminate such activity may retain the ownership of control of shares in
any company carrying on such activity for a period of two years from the
date on which its authority was so terminated by the Board. As used in this
subsection, the term "affiliate" shall mean any company more than 5 per
centum of whose voting shares is directly or indirectly owned or controlled
or held with power to vote by the specified foreign bank or company.
(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed to define a branch or
agency of a foreign bank or a commercial lending company controlled by a
foreign bank or foreign company that controls a foreign bank as a "bank"
for the purposes of any provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act of
1956, or section 105 of the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of
1970, except that any such branch, agency or commercial lending company
subsidiary shall be deemed a "bank" or "banking subsidiary", as the case
may be, for the purposes of applying the prohibitions of section 106 of the
Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970 and the exemptions
provided in sections 4(c)(1), 4(c)(2), 4(c)(3) and 4(c)(4) of the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956 (12 U.S.C. 1843(c) (1), (2), (3), and (4)) to any foreign
bank or other company to which subsection (a) applies.
